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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Public health funding in Ontario has been the subject of some debate partly due to 
arrangements whereby funding (and governance) is split between the provincial and municipal 
governments.  While funding contributions from municipalities for public health are prescribed by 
law, there is evidence of reluctance on the part of some municipalities to pay their required 
portion.  In addition, the policy stance taken by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
(AMO) is that public health should not be funded from the property tax base.  
Since many public health programs are interconnected to the traditional services provided 
by municipalities, it was hypothesized that this reluctance to fund may be due to the differences in 
characteristics of the diverse public health programs found in local public health organizations.  
 A survey was sent to all municipal politicians in Ontario to attempt to discover if there 
was a difference in their attitudes towards municipal funding of public health by type of public 
health program.  Public health programs were divided into two types—protection-type programs 
and promotion-type programs.  
 It was found that while the respondents exhibited strong overall support for government 
funding of both types of programs, municipal politicians in Ontario showed a significant 
preference for committing municipal funds to protection-type programs than for promotion-type 
programs.  
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
This research explores the willingness of municipal elected officials (councillors and 
heads-of-council) to commit municipal revenue to local public health programs.  It finds that this 
willingness is strongly affected by the type of public health program under consideration.   This 
question was asked in reply to statements found in reports commissioned by the Ontario 
government in response to the Walkerton water tragedy in 2000 and the SARS outbreak of 2003, 
claiming that many Ontario Public Health Units (PHUs) suffer from a lack of municipal 
administrative and political support.   For example the final report on SARS states that:  
 
Ontario’s 36 local health units are the front line of protection against infectious disease.  
That chain of protection is only as strong as its weakest link. Some health units are well  
governed, some poorly… these weak links often result from the system of two  
governments, provincial and municipal, being involved in the operation of local health  
units (Campbell, 2nd Interim Report, 71). 
 
 
Commissioner Campbell goes on to state that the only ‘serious’ solution to the present 
problem (which is defined essentially as encroachment of the Medical Officer of Health’s powers 
by bureaucratic and political interests at the local government level, particularly in matters 
involving PHUs’ budgets) is to “upload the funding and control of public health 100 per cent to 
the province and to get municipalities out of the public health business”.  He gives the present 
system a respite, however, until the end of 2007 and states that the “burden of persuasion” is on 
those who believe that the present system of split governance should be preserved.  
Justice O’Connor makes three recommendations in Part One of the Walkerton Inquiry 
regarding local PHUs.  All Boards of Health should be required to have a full-time local Medical 
Officer of Health.  Second, the province should audit local health units to ensure their compliance 
with provincially established standards and third, the role of the local health unit in regard to 
municipal water systems should be clarified and strengthened (O’Connor, 499).  These 
recommendations leave the current municipal/provincial split governance intact while 
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underscoring provincial responsibility to enforce standards locally.  However, the 
recommendation for provincial ‘auditing’ of PHUs spoke to findings whereby PHUs were 
suspected or known to be not following provincial requirements.  
Ontario PHUs are governed by provincial statute:  the Health Protection and Promotion 
Act.  This Act states that municipalities are obligated to pay to their PHU any and all “expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of the board of health of the health unit in the performance of its 
functions and duties under this or any other Act” (Section 72 (1) Health Protection and Promotion 
Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter H.7).   Municipalities have no choice but to pay for any and all 
expenses that their board of health or their medical officer of health deems necessary to carry out 
the functions of the PHU.  This obligation is offset by the requirement that each board of health’s 
membership include municipally-elected officials.   
A ‘board of health’ is defined by the Act as either one of six regional local governments 
or the County of Oxford; or a single-tier municipality acting as a board of health or an agency, or 
a board or organization prescribed by regulation.  This in effect leads to two major types of 
PHUs:  those who are directly integrated into the administration of a lower or upper-tier 
municipality or those who are administered by an entity separate from the municipality:  an 
agency, board or commission.   
Blame for PHU difficulties has been directed at the split municipal-provincial governance 
model; however, other important factors may be at the root of the problem.  This research 
explores one possibility—the types of public health programs that PHUs deliver are affecting the 
willingness of local political actors to support them.   Differentiation of public health programs is 
rarely articulated when issues of funding and/or compliance with provincial standards are 
explored.  This research investigates whether or not municipal elected officials’ willingness to 
fund public health from the property tax base is affected by the type of public health program 
being considered, e.g. protection-type or promotion-type program.  
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 2. LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH IN ONTARIO 
i.  Viewpoint of Ontario Municipalities:  Public Health Funding  
The Campbell Report on SARS consists of two interim reports and a Final Report.  In the 
first interim report the municipal perspective is captured in a statement from the Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario.  One idea summarizes the AMO view—public health will continue to 
be less than adequate unless the province makes policy changes that include removing financing 
of public health programs from the property tax base (Campbell, 1st Interim Report, 216). 
 AMO did not contribute further to Commissioner Campbell’s investigation.  Campbell 
writes that “during the preparation of this second interim report the Commission repeatedly asked 
the AMO for its assistance and position on a number of the issues addressed in this report, 
including the continuation of local public health governance. The Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario unfortunately found itself unable to take a position” (96).  However, AMO was able to 
present a response in 2006 to a provincially-commissioned committee that examining how public 
health capacity could be maximized (AMO’s Response to the Final Report of the Capacity 
Review Committee:  Revitalizing Ontario’s Public Health Capacity, August 1, 2006).  AMO 
stated unequivocally that public health should not be funded from the local property tax base but 
that given the reality of continued split accountability and financing, municipalities must retain 
governance responsibility.  In particular, concern was expressed about the report’s 
recommendation to have a “special purpose arms length body” governance design which violates 
the ‘pay for say’ principle that AMO advocates.  
 Public health funding has been a recognized issue of policy contention for municipalities 
since the province of Ontario announced, in 1996, complete downloading of financial 
responsibility for public health during an exercise which saw other previous provincial 
responsibilities downloaded to municipalities.  The 100% download put local PHU’s into an 
immediate fiscal crisis and focused the attention of municipal actors on the fiscal aspects of public 
 
 8
health in an unprecedented way.   Ontario reversed its decision within the year, instead adjusting 
the cost-sharing ratio to 50-50.  However, this exercise, along with the accompanying 
downloading of social service costs resulted in Ontario municipalities shouldering more health 
and social service costs than municipalities in any other province with the exception of the NWT 
and Nunavut (Kitchen, 20).    It is important to note that while ‘health and social services’ are 
frequently referred to as one entity during discussions of provincial downloading, social services 
expenditures alone increased as a percentage of total municipal expenditures from 14.6 to 25.0 
during the period from 1988 to 2000, while health expenditures increased during this same period 
from 2.9 to 3.3 (Kitchen, 20).     
The perception that the increase in public health expenditures is larger than it truly is may 
be partially due to the quick succession of changes to public health funding that occurred after 
1996.   Cost-sharing was first instituted in 1935 as part of ongoing provincial efforts (beginning in 
1882) to encourage municipalities to provide local boards of health (some municipalities had 
established these as early as 1833).  Grants varied generally by population until 1967 when the 
current system of PHUs was instituted which included 75% funding from the province for local 
public health (Powell).    This level of funding remained until 1996 when the province announced 
it was downloading 100% of PHU costs to their participating municipalities before reverting to 
50% funding in 1999.  Since then, in response to recommendations made after Walkerton and 
SARS, the provincial share of public health costs have risen and are projected to be at the 75% 
level again by the end of 2007.    
Although this ten-year ‘roller coaster’ of funding changes may have influenced the 
municipal perception of local public health funding it is important to note that conflicts regarding 
funding, governance, requirements to meet with provincial standards and structures of health units 
have been ongoing since the first Public Health Act was passed in 1884 (Powell).  In addition, 
AMO’s position, that mandatory public health programs be funded 100% by the province, has 
been in place since at least 1982 (Powell, 345).  Furthermore, debate and changes to local public 
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health governance, funding and standards are known to occur on a more or less regular schedule 
that mirrors the arrival and departure of major communicable disease outbreaks.  John Duffy’s 
historical look at public health in the United States, for example, articulates as one of its four 
main themes the constant back and forth between apathy about recommended public health 
control measures and sharp reactions to periodic disease outbreak crisis.    The phenomena of the 
creation and dismantling of boards of health in response to periodic outbreaks noted by Duffy 
occurred in early Ontario as well.  A history of public health in London, Ontario confirms this:  
“Between 1830 and 1885, there were at least 10 temporary boards of health in the London district.  
Each was organized during a medical crisis—most usually during epidemics…” (Middlesex-
London Health Unit, 9).   What may be needed, rather than another change in governance or 
structure, is another way of looking at which public health programs are best delivered at the local 
level and why.  
 
 
 
ii. Public Health:  One Goal:  Two Very Different Strategies  
Public health organizations frequently struggle with being misunderstood by the public 
they serve.  ‘Public health’ is often confused with ‘publicly-funded health care’—the two terms 
may be interchangeable in countries without publicly-funded health care; but is less so in 
countries such as Canada.  Public health specifically focuses on the goal of preventing diseases 
before they incur, thereby avoiding the costs of treatment and the ill-effects of suffering from 
disease.  Public health, by definition, focuses on the health of populations, rather than individuals.    
Historically public health in the western world evolved from a need to control the spread 
of communicable diseases which caused illness, disability, death and fear in local communities. 
The international growth of trade in the 18th and 19th centuries brought increased mobility of 
infectious diseases.  At the same time, increasing urbanization led to issues of sanitation among 
people living in shrinking environments.  Thus, early public health focused on community 
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sanitation and attempts to control infectious diseases (Duffy, Rosen).  One major scientific 
breakthrough changed public health at the end of the 19th century:  the discovery of 
incontrovertible proof of the ‘germ theory’ of infectious disease; until then, leading medical 
professionals disputed the cause of infectious disease outbreaks.  This discovery quickly brought 
about the invention of antibiotics, vaccines and sanitary engineering advances.  In many ways it 
was believed that the era of communicable disease threats was over, at least in those parts of the 
world that could afford the medical and engineering innovations.  However, public health 
programs remained an important aspect of the western world’s health system as it was recognized 
that other determinants of health (e.g. socioeconomic, education,) still left some groups 
vulnerable to infectious diseases.  A growing concern with chronic diseases—which appeared as 
life spans lengthened and as more of the natural environment became converted to a built 
environment—also shifted public health focus.  Funding and policy in public health began to 
favour these new threats—programs that emphasized health behaviour changes grew as funding 
for protection programs began to stagnate.   Public health history and policy accounts of public 
health in the western world for most of the past 100 years supports this view:  for example, 
Heather MacDougall’s history of the Toronto Department of Health accepts a shift from 
“communicable to lifestyle diseases” as a natural evolution of public health in the twentieth 
century (295).   
Beginning with HIV in the early 1980’s and ending with the multi-country SARS 
outbreak in 2003, it is now widely recognized that the era of communicable diseases is not over.   
In addition to high-profile, novel disease outbreaks other communicable disease threats loom 
more quietly, e.g. the rise in antibiotic-resistant communicable diseases such as TB and MRSA.  
Also emerging are risks of disease from the environment due to infrastructure decay, pollution 
and the arrival in the west of new species of insects and animals that act as vectors of disease.   
The two types of programs, traditional public health interventions designed primarily to 
combat disease that were obtained from other people, animals or the environment and the 
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‘lifestyle’ or chronic disease prevention programs, can be termed ‘health protection-type’ and 
‘health promotion-type’ programs.   
Before the differences inherent in these two types of programs are outlined further, it is 
important to recognize that a complete division between the two is neither possible nor desirable.  
For example, enforcement of recreational water sanitation regulations is an example of a health 
protection-type program but some of the strategies designed to encourage a user to avoid use of 
the facility while ill with a gastrointestinal upset frequently rely on the tools of health promotion 
(education, influence on facility policy development, mass media campaigns).  Conversely, the 
encouragement of healthier eating habits is generally thought of as a health promotion-type 
program but can have health protection elements when a public health organization seeks to limit 
food choices available to the public by statute or policy.  However, generally speaking, most 
public health programs can be readily categorized as using strategies that consist primarily of 
either protection or promotion approaches and thus can be classified as either protection or 
promotion type programs.  
Health promotion includes those activities which primarily aim to change individual, 
family, neighbourhood and societal behaviours to establish increased population health.  
Examples include promotion of healthy eating, physical activity and smoking cessation.  It can 
also include overt attempts to influence public policy outside of the health portfolio to increase 
population health (e.g. advocating for a more substantial income for those who require income 
support).  The goal is a healthier population.   From an economic perspective, achievement of this 
goal provides two benefits—a populace that is more able to contribute to production (less chronic 
illness, longer lives) and that will incur less costs in terms of claims to the publicly-funded health 
insurance system.   Health promotion is thus concerned with direct economic externalities.    
 Economic externalities can be thought of as the cost that an individual incurs because 
other individuals are engaging in unhealthy behaviours.  This is an issue that, in the private 
market, is often dealt with by insurance companies.  Premiums paid by consumers are based on 
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both their own choices (to maintain a healthy weight or not) and the choices of others (how many 
obese people are covered by a policy).  Insurance companies deal with this by basing their costs 
on the prevalence of those with conditions or habits that mean costs down the road, by adjusting 
individual premiums based on the individual’s choices and by excluding those whose behaviours 
are predictive of future high costs.  A government-run health insurance plan, however, is more 
limited in its ability to control costs in these ways.  It does not (usually) adjust individual 
premiums based on individual behaviour and, in Canada, by law cannot exclude those who are 
engaging in more risky behaviour.  It can and does attempt to base costs on the prevalence or 
habits of disease conditions and is motivated to decrease these costs by decreasing the prevalence 
of bad health behaviours.  The externality here is the increased cost to every individual (with 
adjustments for equity in the tax system) for the bad choices of other individuals.  Since the 
‘insurance company’ in effect here is the provincial government, it makes sense for this level of 
government to fully fund and administer the health care system, including those activities which 
are specifically designed to decrease the costs involved.  For this reason, activities with the 
primary goal of reducing health care costs should be funded and administered by the provincial 
government.  The activities can be contracted out to private companies, NGO’s or other levels of 
government such as municipalities or municipal agencies.  However, the full cost should be borne 
by the level of government who is responsible for the health care system.  This is not the current 
case in Ontario where health promotion programs are partially paid for using property taxes.  
Health protection, on the other hand,  has as its objective the protection of people from 
diseases which may be transferred from contaminated food or water, other vectors (such as insects 
or animals) or from another person who is communicable with a disease.  This includes non-
biological disease-causing factors that arise from the environment such as environmental tobacco 
smoke or lead in water or paint.   If health protection is lacking, and people acquire diseases from 
their environment, economic analysis will also show the same two economic effects as health 
promotion—a negative effect on production and increased costs to the publicly-funded health care 
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system.  However, there is an important third consequence, not found in health promotion, which 
is the effect on the municipality where the health protection problem appears.  
When considering the impact of each type of program on a municipality, promotional 
programs, with their main economic externalities being related to the publicly-funded health care 
system, have little direct impact on municipal government. This is not to say that communities do 
not differ in their rates of lifestyle diseases—promotional programs need to be targeted to match 
the unique needs of communities.   Protection programs, most of which involve environmental 
public health programs (provision of safe food and water, eradication of infectious disease risk 
from the environment and the abatement of other environmental contaminants) directly involve 
municipal government.   Health protection programs and services are as essential to a local 
community as road maintenance and police protection.  The Walkerton water tragedy illustrates 
that while a disease outbreak in a community may produce large externalities the “costly effects 
beyond that municipality’s are never as high as the damage caused within the municipality itself” 
(Sancton and Janik, 51).   The costs of a disease outbreak in a community go beyond the medical 
costs to treat the affected population within and outside of a community.  The costs also include 
the cost of reputation damage which may impact the all-important economic development goal of 
virtually all communities—people may lose trust in community leaders and managers and either 
move away or choose not to locate their home or business in that particular place.  
Health protection goals are the intent of several municipal services including land control, 
provision of drinking water, sewage treatment, waste disposal and by-laws and license 
requirements around establishments such as restaurants, funeral homes, boarding homes and 
personal service settings.   The claim that Ontario municipalities should not be funding their local 
public health protection programs, that the provincial government should instead do so, is 
analogous to private corporations giving over their quality assurance programs to a cost-shared 
umbrella organization to administer it for them.  While this does exist in some forms 
(accreditation agency standards for private hospitals and labs, for example) generally private 
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companies have a recognized moral and legal responsibility for the safety of their own products.  
Risk management strategies are used to ensure that products are safe; demand will fall sharply if a 
product becomes known to be or believed to be contaminated.  Recently, municipalities have been 
thought of as a ‘product choice’ that a consumer can make.  This public choice theory states that 
people can and will simply change the location of their home or business to match the level of 
taxes and services they want.  Municipal leaders have responded by marketing their 
municipalities and highlighting low taxes and, increasingly, superior services that their city or 
town provides.  Leaving public health protection to another level of government puts 
municipalities in a position whereby they do not control or manage their own public health 
protection risks.   
The following table summarized the inherent differences in public health protection-type 
programs and promotion-type programs as they relate to municipalities.  
 
Table 1.  Summary of Protection and Promotion Characteristics 
 Protection Promotion 
Economic externality re: publicly 
funded health care system 
Yes Yes 
Economic externality re: more 
productive, healthier citizens 
Yes Yes 
Effect on others perception of 
Municipality/municipality’s 
reputation 
Yes Possibly 
Related to Other Municipal 
Services 
Yes No  
 
 
Complete provincial funding of protection-type programs has another possible downside: 
provincial politicians are also sensitive to costs and to taxes and should a government come to 
power with these goals to the exclusion of all others, public health could suffer across the 
province with consequences more far reaching than those coming from one health unit battling 
fiscal constraint from one municipality.    
 
 15
Information from the relations between federal and provincial governments may be 
cautionary here: “…efforts to constrain public health spending [referring here to publicly funded 
health care] in federations will be easiest when control over the key policy instruments is 
effectively lodged at one level of government, whether at the federal or the state/provincial level.  
In cases when control over the key levels of cost containment is divided, the prospects for cost 
containment would seem to depend heavily on the effectiveness of mechanisms of 
intergovernmental coordination” (Banting and Corbett, 27).  These authors conclude “the 
consolidation of power at one level clearly does create the capacity for governments to squeeze 
the system when needed” (Banting and Corbett, 29).  100% provincial funding and control could 
seriously jeopardize health protection in Ontario in the future, once the memory of Walkerton and 
SARS fade; thus, municipalities have a vested interest in retaining some control over health 
protection-type programs.    
 
 
iii.   Necessity and Complications of Multi-level Funding and Control 
Municipal elected officials stand accused in the Campbell Report of being reluctant to 
meet their statutory obligations to fund public health.  The Report contains first-person accounts 
from medical officers of health giving examples where municipal politicians and administrators 
attempt to move public health funds to other areas of the municipal budget.  “Basic protection 
against disease should not have to compete for money with potholes and hockey arenas” states 
Campbell (1st Interim Report, 215).  Municipalities in Ontario are obligated by law to provide the 
monies as requested by their health unit.  The terms of this obligation are set out in the Health 
Protection and Promotion Act, Section 72.    
While primarily health protection-type programs can be shown to be interconnected with 
municipal services it is still necessary to have provincial funding in place to support these types of 
programs.  First, economies-of-scale dictate that health protection, particularly regarding the 
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control of infectious diseases, is a program that requires the participation of more than one level 
of government—the technical and scientific expertise necessary to implement the most current 
surveillance, laboratory and research are well beyond the fiscal capacity of municipal 
governments and possibly provincial governments as well.  Second, infectious diseases and 
environmental contamination do not respect municipal, provincial or national boundaries.  Third, 
disease surveillance, using modern technology, requires the involvement of a government that has 
as far reaching powers as possible.  Lastly, communicable diseases have a unique characteristic 
evident in any historical account of a disease outbreak, including the 2003 SARS outbreak:  a 
potential to decrease societal stability.  Contaminated water and food increase scarcity of these 
essential elements of life and undermine people’s trust in their systems of government.  Fear of 
acquiring a disease that is spread person-to-person or through an intermediary such as disease-
carrying insects, affects people’s behaviours and beliefs.  Actually acquiring a disease this way 
can cause panic that threatens the entire infrastructure of society and government.  Thus, health 
protection-type programs may need to be administered and financed by every level of 
government—municipal, provincial, national and international.  
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3.  STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH UNITS IN ONTARIO 
 
Public health, as a public program that requires administration, is unique in its tendency 
to have a medical doctor as the administrative head of its organizations.  In Ontario, this is 
encouraged by statute; while the HPPA sets out a requirement that each PHU engage a full-time 
medical officer of health, it does allow for the appointment of an ‘acting’ medical officer of health 
in health units where this position is vacant.  Two issues have arisen, outlined in both the 
O’Connor report on Walkerton and the Campbell report on SARS, as a result:  in some cases, 
PHUs have not recruited a medical officer of health, preferring to rely on a community physician 
to be an ‘acting’ medical officer.  In others, particularly in PHUs that are part of a regional local 
government system, conflict between the fulltime medical officer of health and the municipal 
CAO occurs as to who has the ‘ultimate’ say in financial and management issues involving public 
health programs and staff.   
PHUs can be categorized as being either ‘autonomous’ or ‘integrated’.  Autonomous 
PHUs are managed by a board of health that is at ‘arms-length’ from the municipalities they 
serve.  Boards have a requirement to have municipal appointees, and these most often are elected 
municipal officials.  Integrated PHUs are part of the administrative structure of a municipality.  
These municipalities may be regional, single-tier or upper-tier.  There is one unique integrated 
PHU, Haldimand-Norfolk, which consists of two single-tier towns sharing the administrative 
functions of health and social services.   
According to research conducted for the Capacity Review Committee, 27 out of 36 PHUs 
have a fulltime medical officer of health (75%) (Starfield Consultants, 108).   More notable is the 
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breakdown between autonomous and integrated PHUs∗ in terms of the administrative head of the 
organization:  
 
Table 2.  Structure-Type and CAO vs. MOH in Ontario Public Health Units 
Type of PHU total number MOH/CAO are separate positions 
Municipally Integrated 14 14   (100%) 
Autonomous 22 6     (27.3%) 
 
 
 Administrative differences between municipally-integrated and autonomous PHUs may 
affect the attitudes of elected municipal officials.  In addition, whether or not a municipal 
politician holds a position in a single-tier or lower or upper tier municipality may have an effect 
on their perception of public health.  PHUs are associated with upper or single tier municipalities 
only.  
                                                          
∗ The Starfield Consultants Report published different numbers than what is found here for health units that 
are municipally-integrated and autonomous.  The numbers here were obtained by analyzing each health 
unit’s structure using information from their websites and the Health Protection and Promotion Act.  
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4.  HYPOTHESIS 
 
For local public health it is possible that elected officials may be more willing to fund 
some public health programs than others and that these differences may be ascertained by whether 
or not a public health program fits more with the identity of health protection or health promotion.  
Possible reasons for this were outlined in section 2 of this report.  
It is generally accepted that administrative actors in democratic countries need to have the 
support of elected officials if they are to influence policy (Sutherland).  Therefore the attitudes of 
elected municipal officials matter in the discussion over public health and, ultimately, policy 
decisions regarding appropriate funding levels and specific responsibilities for municipalities.  
A survey was created, administered and the results analyzed to test the following hypothesis:  
 
 
Elected municipal officials in Ontario are more willing to commit municipal funds to public 
health protection-type programs than to public health promotion-type programs.   
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5.  METHODOLOGY 
 
i. Survey Design 
 
An invitation to complete a survey was sent to all elected municipal officials in Ontario.  
The survey was internet-based and officials were asked to participate by e-mail.  E-mail addresses 
for Ontario municipal councilors and heads of council were obtained by purchasing the 2007 
Ontario Municipal Directory Communication Edition published by the Association of Municipal 
Managers, Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario (AMCTO).  The Directory contained listings for 
3,255 elected municipal positions.  The survey was designed using principles outlined in 
Dillman’s Mail and Internet Surveys, The Tailored Design Method.  A decision was made to 
survey the entire population, rather than a sample, as cost was quite low to do so using an internet 
survey.   An on-line commercial survey software program, Surveymonkey, was used which 
allowed for the use of more complex design features.   
 The survey was divided into three main sections.  The first section asked for the 
respondent’s demographics, length of time served as an elected official and information about the 
respondent’s involvement with their municipality’s associated Board of Health.  This section also 
asked the respondent to agree or disagree with the statement “Municipal taxpayers in Ontario pay 
too great a proportion of the funding required for health and social services”.   
 The second section asked the respondent questions about the municipality that he/she 
represents.  Questions were asked about the population size, urban or rural characteristic, and the 
respondent’s perception of their constituency’s wealth and health.  In addition, the respondent was 
asked which PHU serves their municipality, whether or not the PHU has a full-time Medical 
Officer of Health, how many Board members their PHU has and how many of these are from the 
respondent’s municipality.  
 The third section listed twelve public health protection and promotion programs (this 
designation was not visible to respondents) and asked the respondent to select one of four options.  
The four options were designed to ascertain the level of support for municipal funding for each 
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program.  The first option was “municipalities should contribute some or all of the funding for 
this program/service” allowing the respondent to make a selection that either reflected current 
practice (split provincial and municipal funding) or an even stronger indication of municipal 
funding support.  The second option “100% provincial funding” gave the respondent the 
opportunity to indicate that the program should be funded wholly by the province.  The third 
option allowed the respondent to indicate that they didn’t know which level of government should 
fund the program.  A fourth option was “there should be no funding for this program/service from 
either level of government” giving respondents the chance to express a lack of support for any 
public funding of that particular public health program.   
 For a copy of the survey, please see Appendix A.   
 
ii. Collection  
 
 Responses were collected beginning on April 18, 2007.  The survey was closed to 
responses on June 15, 2007.  The survey was sent to a number larger than the population of 
elected officials due to initial confusion regarding the size of the population—some municipal 
officials (approximately 391) hold two elected positions due to cross appointment to upper-tier 
municipal positions and therefore received the survey twice.  The survey was also made available 
in an electronic file form that could be printed, filled out by hand and returned either by regular 
mail or fax as a result of numerous requests received during the collection period.  Reasons 
communicated to the researcher for preference of a ‘hard copy’ included lack of willingness to 
complete an on-line survey, technical difficulties with the survey and lack of access to either the 
internet or a high-speed connection.   The following table summarizes the survey collection 
activities.  
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Table 3.  Summary of Survey Collection Activities 
 
DATE SENT TO METHOD RESULTS 
   Responses Bad Addresses 
April 18 3,255 Councillor 
e-mail addresses 
From AMCTO 
Directory 
E-mail, sent via 
SurveyMonkey 
226 79 councillors had no e-mail 
address listed  
28 addresses were invalid/rejected 
387 duplicates noted and removed 
78 chose to ‘opt out’ of survey 
May 6 2,491 Non-
responders 
E-mail, sent via 
SurveyMonkey 
272 12 chose to ‘opt out’ of survey 
May 21 2,207 Non-
responders 
E-mail, sent via 
SurveyMonkey 
158 22 ‘rejected’ addresses 
122 chose to ‘opt out’ of survey 
May 31 441 Municipal 
Clerks 
E-mail, sent via researcher’s 
personal e-mail account 
N/A .pdf copy of survey sent 
June 4 1,295 Non-
responders  
E-mail, sent via researcher’s 
personal e-mail account  
99 Approximately 600 ‘bad’ 
addresses* investigated and 
corrected or removed  
June 15 N/A Data Entry of Hard Copies 
Received Via Fax and Mail  
27 Manually entered into online survey 
by researcher 
Total  
Responses  
  782  
* ‘bad’ addresses found included those where a generic municipal email address or an address for 
the municipal clerk was used in the AMCTO Directory, rather than a councilor’s individual email 
address.  Individual addresses were collected in these cases by checking municipalities’ website 
information.  
 
 
 
  
Contacting potential respondents multiple times has been shown to be the most effective 
technique for increasing response rates to surveys (Dillman, 149).  This strategy also applies to 
internet surveys (Dillman, 367) and is in fact easier and less expensive to do compared with 
traditional survey methods such as regular mail.  Therefore, three different cover letters 
containing a link to the on-line survey were composed and sent on each of April 18, May 6 and 
May 21.   The May 21 cover letter was sent again on June 4 as approximately 600 of these e-mail 
addresses were investigated (using municipal councilor e-mail contact information found on 
municipal homepages on the internet) and corrected.  Please see Appendix B for a copy of the 
letters.  The remaining e-mail addresses (approximately 700) were sent using a different sending 
e-mail address necessitated by the discovery that survey invitations sent by SurveyMonkey 
created the possibility that SPAM filters at the recipient's organization or e-mail domain were 
blocking the survey invitations.   The survey invitations appeared to come from the researcher’s 
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own e-mail account but actually were being sent from SurveyMonkey.  SPAM filters will block 
email sent using this method because filters check to confirm that the domain of the sender's e-
mail address matches the domain of the sending mail server. 
 
 
iii. Response Rate  
 
 Ascertaining an accurate number of elected municipal officials in Ontario was 
surprisingly difficult.  AMCTO’s Ontario Municipal Directory provided 3,255 names when the 
data was filtered to include elected officials from all municipalities.  AMCTO claims 
inclusiveness for all Ontario municipalities.  The AMO website refers to 3,135 positions which 
they surveyed to gain 2006 election information.  Both numbers, however, include duplication 
whereby one person holds two elected municipal positions due to being a representative of both a 
lower and an upper tier municipality.    
 To find the actual number of persons elected to municipal positions the AMO website 
was used.  This website lists the complete list of 2006 municipal election results.  The number of 
councilors and heads-of-council elected and acclaimed was manually counted.   In addition, all 
upper-tier municipality websites were viewed.  These included both County governments and 
Regional governments.  It was necessary to assess each upper-tier as there is not consistency in 
Ontario with regard to how upper-tier councilors are selected.  In some cases they are elected at-
large to fulfill only the role of an upper-tier councilor; in other cases councilors are appointed to 
the upper-tier by virtue of their lower-tier elected role.  Some regional governments have an 
elected Regional Chair; others have an appointed Chair—the decision was made not to include 
Regional Chairs if they are not already included in lower-tier elections.  Assessing each upper-tier 
mechanism allowed for the removal of duplications so that each elected official was counted only 
one time.  397 names were removed from the list.  Table 4 shows the total responses.  
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                 Table 4.  Overall Response Rate 
Completed on-line 755 
Manual Data Entry (survey received 
by mail, fax or email) 
27 
Responded on-line indicating they 
did not want to do the survey 
212 
Total Responded 994 
Number of Ontario Councillors  2863 
Percentage  34.7 
 
 
  
The data collected was converted from the on-line survey software to SPSS.  When the data was 
examined it was noted that some respondents had chosen to begin but not end the survey.  The 
most common strategy detected was a willingness to complete the first two sections of the survey 
but not the third section.  Since the third section, responding to questions regarding the 12 public 
health programs, was essential for the analysis of this research, those survey responses were 
removed from the analysis.  Table 5 shows the response rate after removal of responses that could 
not be used.  
 
 
  Table 5.  Response Rate Used for Analysis 
Total Responded 994 
Less Did not Want to Participate 212 
Less Incomplete Surveys  68 
Total  714 
Number of Ontario Councillors  2863 
Percentage  24.9 
 
 
 For the purposes of this paper, the response rate used for analysis, 24.9%, will be the 
figure referred to when discussing ‘response rate’. 
 
 
 
iv. Assessing Representativeness of Respondents  
 
Full-time Medical Officer of Health 
 27 out of 36 PHUs have a fulltime medical officer of health (75%).  545 survey 
respondents, out of 737 who answered the question ‘does your health unit have a full-time 
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medical officer of health’ said yes (74%).   This indicates a possible close correlation between the 
actual population of Ontario municipal councillors and the sample obtained for this analysis.  
 
Gender 
AMO found in a post-election survey (2006) that 23.85% of municipal elected positions 
are female.  This is based on 3,135 elected positions responding to the survey; therefore 
duplication (one person holding a position in both a lower and an upper-tier municipality) is 
likely.   
30.8% of survey respondents are female.  This may indicate an increased interest in 
‘health’ in general on the part of women officials.  However without availability of an accurate 
number of female elected officials in Ontario it is difficult to assess representation by gender.  
Women are not underrepresented in this survey but may be somewhat overrepresented.  
 
 Table 6   Gender of Respondent 
  Frequency % 
Valid male 481 67.4 
  female 220 30.8 
  Total 701 98.2 
No Response  13 1.8 
Total 714 100.0 
 
 
 
Region 
Ontario’s 36 PHU’s are divided into ‘regions’.  These are Northwest (2 PHU’s), 
Northeast (5 PHUs), Central East (7 PHUs), Central West (7 PHUs), Southwest (9 PHUs) and 
Eastern (6 PHUs).  Appendix C shows the location and name of each health unit.  Responses were 
received from councilors in every PHU region (as defined by the Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care) and from every individual PHU.  The number of councilors per PHU was calculated 
utilizing the AMO 2006 published election results and Ontario Regulation 553 (‘Areas 
Comprising Health Units’) under the Health Protection and Promotion Act which specifies which 
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municipalities fall within the jurisdiction of each Ontario PHU.   Table 7 illustrates this number, 
along with the number of councillors who responded and the resulting percentages.  
Regional representation was achieved with the North region being least represented and 
Central West being the most.    17.9% of analyzed responses were from the North; 22.5% were 
from the Eastern region; 24.8% were from Central East; 31.1% from SouthWest and 33.1% of the 
responses were from Central West.   
Two PHU’s had very high response rates from their associated municipal councilors—
Perth was the highest with 54.7% of their municipal councilors responding and Waterloo had a 
response rate of 45.8%.  This may reflect a greater enthusiasm on the part of particular councilors 
who may have encouraged others to respond or perhaps these PHU’s have recently experienced 
local public health issues of interest to municipal councilors.  
The lowest individual PHU response rates were North Bay Parry Sound (12.5%), Algoma 
(13.0%) and Thunder Bay (14.5%), reflecting the noted overall response rate of the North region.  
Outside of the North region, councilors in the city of Toronto (15.5%), KFLA(16.2%) and 
Renfrew (17.6%) were the lowest responders.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Responses by Region  
HEALTH UNIT BY REGION  Total Number of 
Municipal 
Councillors By 
Health Unit  
Number of Councillors 
Who Responded By 
Health Unit  
% 
North Region     
North Bay-Parry Sound  184 23 12.5 
Northwestern  107 20 18.7 
Timiskaming  127 28 22.0 
Algoma  131 17 13.0 
Sudbury  124 18 14.5 
Thunder Bay District  89 25 28.1 
Porcupine  65 17 26.2 
REGION TOTAL   827 148 17.9 
     
Central East Region     
Simcoe Muskoka  192 48 25.0 
Haliburton Kawartha Pine Ridge  81 21 26.0 
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HEALTH UNIT BY REGION  Total Number of 
Municipal 
Councillors By 
Health Unit  
Number of Councillors 
Who Responded By 
Health Unit  
% 
Peterborough  51 17 33.3 
York Region  75 19 25.3 
Durham  61 14 22.3 
Peel  32 7 21.9 
Toronto  45 7 15.5 
REGION TOTAL  537 133 24.8 
     
Eastern Region     
Hastings and Prince Edward  89 17 19.1 
Leeds, Grenville and Lanark  161 44 27.3 
Eastern Ontario  103 27 26.2 
Kingston, Frontenac, Lennox & 
Addington 
 68 11 16.2 
Ottawa  24 7 29.2 
Renfrew  125 22 17.6 
REGION TOTAL  570 128 22.5 
     
Central West Region     
Niagara  106 36 34.0 
Hamilton  16 6 37.5 
Brant  22 7 31.8 
Waterloo  48 22 45.8 
Halton  41 15 36.6 
Wellington Dufferin Guelph  107 28 26.2 
Haldimand Norfolk  16 4 25.0 
REGION TOTAL  356 118 33.1 
     
SouthWest Region     
Grey Bruce  125 36 28.8 
Huron  78 24 30.8 
Perth  53 29 54.7 
Oxford  50 14 28.0 
Middlesex London  70 23 32.9 
Elgin-St. Thomas  49 15 30.6 
Chatham-Kent  18 5 27.8 
Lambton  69 17 24.6 
Windsor-Essex  61 15 24.6 
REGION TOTAL   573 178 31.1 
Councillor Unsure of Health Unit    5  
TOTAL  2863 710 24.8 
Add ‘System Missing’ =4   714 24.9 
 
 
 In conclusion, based on regional information in particular, the sample used for analysis is 
a reasonably representative sample of Ontario municipal councillors and heads-of-council.  
 
v. Selection of the 12 Public Health Programs 
 
 An initial list of public health programs was compiled using the Ontario Mandatory 
Programs and Services as a guide and the websites of all 36 Ontario PHUs.  28 programs were 
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identified that could be classified either as more strongly belonging to the category of ‘Health 
Promotion’ or to the category of ‘Health Protection’.   
 Definitions of public health are ubiquitous.  The Ontario Ministry of Health and Long 
Term Care’s website defines public health as being concerned with “the health and well-being of 
the whole community, rather than the treatment of illness and disability.”  Further on in the same 
discussion, the Ministry states that public health focuses on three areas:  preventing conditions 
that may put health at risk (health protection), early detection of health problems (screening), and 
changing peoples and societies attitudes and practices regarding lifestyle choices (health 
promotion).  It goes on to say that health protection tends to work in the area of food and water 
safety, environmental risks, public sanitation and management of communicable diseases.  
 While most public health programs involve an element of both health protection and 
health promotion they can be categorized as more fully belonging to one the other.  The list of 
Ontario Mandatory programs does designate programs this way.  However, some Ontario PHU’s 
are administratively organized in this way and public health professionals are readily able to make 
this distinction.  To test the researcher’s interpretation of a program designation as health 
promotion or health protection several public health professionals from five different PHUs were 
recruited in February 2007.  They were given the list of 28 programs and asked to mark each one 
as either ‘health protection’ or ‘health promotion’.  Participants could also select ‘unsure’ and 
record comments.   The table below summarizes the results.  
 
Table 8.  Designation of Public Health Programs as Health Protection or Health Promotion, 
Participant Public Health Speciality 
 
Public Health 
Nurse 
Public Health 
Inspector 
Physician Epidemiologist Dietician Total Participants 
6 14 1 1 1 23 
 
 
Table 9.   Designation of Public Health Programs as Health Protection or Health Promotion, 
Participant Years of Experience 
 
Less than 1 year 2 to 5 years 5 to 15 years More than 15 years Total Participants 
1 11 9 2 23 
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Table 10.  Designation of Public Health Programs as Health Protection or Health Promotion, Results 
of Participant Responses 
 
23/23 agreement 22/23 agreement 21/23 agreement <21 agreement 
11 programs 7 programs 2 programs 8 programs  
 
 
 
Based on these results, 8 programs which failed to find greater than 90% consensus were removed 
from the pool of possible program questions for the survey.  The remaining 20 programs were 
used to make the question choices for the survey.  The following criteria were considered in 
making the choices: 
• A maximum of 12 questions was desired to keep the survey as short as possible. 
• The 12 programs must be equally divided between Promotion and Protection designation.  
• The description of the program must be both brief and easily understandable to a non 
public health audience.  
 
Table 11.  Programs Used for the Survey 
(For each question respondents were asked to choose a level of municipal funding support.  See Appendix A for a copy 
of the survey.)  
Question Short form name for analysis  Type of Program Designation 
1.  Educating citizens about the 
importance of avoiding alcohol-use 
during pregnancy 
alcohol-use and pregnancy 
awareness 
Promotion 
2.  Assessing the need for quarantine 
and/or medical treatment in all cases of 
animal bites to help prevent the 
transmission of rabies from an animal 
to a human 
rabies control Protection 
3.  Regularly evaluating the microbial 
quality of drinking water used at rural 
community centres 
drinking water 1 Protection 
4.  Providing classes in parenting parenting Promotion 
5.  Advocating for healthy food choice 
options to be available at local 
restaurants and cafeterias 
healthy eating 1 Promotion 
6.  Giving the public information about 
healthy nutrition choices 
healthy eating 2 Promotion 
7.  Testing local beach waters for the 
presence of bacteria that can cause 
illness to swimmers and other 
recreational users 
recreational water  Protection 
8.  Monitoring the results of tests for drinking water 2 Protection 
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Question Short form name for analysis  Type of Program Designation 
bacteria such as e.coli in municipal 
drinking water systems to prevent an 
outbreak of waterborne illness 
9.  Offering information to teens about 
drug addiction 
recreational drug use awareness  Promotion 
10.  Ensuring that infection control 
safeguards are in place in local barber 
and hair ships, spas and nail salons 
community infection control Protection 
11.  Providing information to the public 
about the benefits of being physically 
active. 
active living  Promotion 
12.  Investigating outbreaks of food 
poisoning associated with local 
restaurants and community events. 
outbreak management Protection 
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7.  ANALYSIS  
 
i. Support for Government Funding of Public Health  
 Notably, support for public funding of all types of public health programs was quite high 
in this sample.   This supports the hypothesis that municipal councilors do appreciate the value of 
public health programs per se, but recognize that some public health programs should not be 
funded from the municipal property tax base.   
Table 12.  General Support for all Programs in Survey 
 
Program % who chose 
municipal and/or 
provincial funding 
Recreational Drug 
Awareness 
95.2 
Alcohol-Use and 
Pregnancy 
91.9 
Health Eating1 90.6 
Active Living 89.5 
Parenting 84.8 
Healthy Eating2 81.6 
Average Total 88.9 
  
Drinking Water1 97.7 
Recreational Water 96.1 
Drinking Water2 95.5 
Outbreak 
Management 
94.6 
Rabies Control 90.0 
Community Infection 
Control 
85.5 
Average Total 93.2 
  
Total Average for 
All Programs 
91.05 
 
 
 
The following tables list the responses for the individual programs.  The first table 
summarizes the promotion program results (number who responded) followed by the detailed 
response for each promotion program.  These results are then repeated for the protection 
programs.  Note that the cumulative percentages are what were used to formulate the general 
support for all programs found in Table 12.  
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Table 13   Promotion Programs, Number of Responses 
  
  alcohol-use and 
pregnancy 
awareness 
(promotion) 
parenting 
(promotion) 
healthy eating 
(promotion) 
healthy eating 
(promotion) 
recreational 
drug use 
awareness 
(promotion) 
active living 
(promotion) 
N Valid 714 709 709 711 711 711 
Did not 
Answer 
0 5 5 3 3 3 
 
 
 
Table 13a     alcohol-use and pregnancy awareness (promotion) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 47 6.6 6.6 6.6 
provincial funding only 609 85.3 85.3 91.9 
unsure 35 4.9 4.9 96.8 
no funding 23 3.2 3.2 100.0 
Total 714 100.0 100.0   
 
 
 
Table 13b     parenting (promotion) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 128 17.9 18.1 18.1 
provincial funding only 473 66.2 66.7 84.8 
unsure 53 7.4 7.5 92.2 
no funding 55 7.7 7.8 100.0 
Total 709 99.3 100.0  
Did not Answer  5 .7   
Total 714 100.0   
 
 
 
Table 13c     healthy eating1 (promotion) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 124 17.4 17.5 17.5 
provincial funding only 452 63.3 63.8 81.2 
unsure 36 5.0 5.1 86.3 
no funding 97 13.6 13.7 100.0 
Total 709 99.3 100.0  
Did not Answer  5 .7   
Total 714 100.0   
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Table 13d     healthy eating2 (promotion) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 79 11.1 11.1 11.1 
provincial funding only 565 79.1 79.5 90.6 
unsure 34 4.8 4.8 95.4 
no funding 33 4.6 4.6 100.0 
Total 711 99.6 100.0  
Did not Answer  3 .4   
Total 714 100.0   
 
 
 
Table 13e     recreational drug use awareness (promotion) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 79 11.1 11.1 11.1 
provincial funding only 598 83.8 84.1 95.2 
unsure 28 3.9 3.9 99.2 
no funding 6 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 711 99.6 100.0  
Did not Answer  3 .4   
Total 714 100.0   
 
 
 
  
Table 13f     active living (promotion) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 96 13.4 13.5 13.5 
provincial funding only 540 75.6 75.9 89.5 
unsure 31 4.3 4.4 93.8 
no funding 44 6.2 6.2 100.0 
Total 711 99.6 100.0  
Did not Answer  3 .4   
Total 714 100.0   
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Table 14   Protection Programs, Number of Responses 
 
  rabies control 
(protection) 
drinking water 
(protection) 
recreational 
water 
(protection) 
drinking water 
(protection) 
community 
infection 
control 
(protection) 
outbreak 
management 
(protection) 
N Valid 712 710 712 711 712 710 
Did not 
Answer  
2 4 2 3 2 4 
 
 
 
Table 14a     rabies control (protection) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 144 20.2 20.2 20.2
provincial funding only 497 69.6 69.8 90.0
unsure 52 7.3 7.3 97.3
no funding 19 2.7 2.7 100.0
Total 712 99.7 100.0  
Did not Answer 2 .3    
Total 714 100.0    
 
 
 
Table 14b     drinking water1 (protection) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 306 42.9 43.1 43.1
provincial funding only 372 52.1 52.4 95.5
unsure 25 3.5 3.5 99.0
no funding 7 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 710 99.4 100.0  
Did not Answer 4 .6    
Total 714 100.0    
 
 
 
Table 14c     recreational water (protection) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 334 46.8 46.9 46.9
provincial funding only 350 49.0 49.2 96.1
unsure 22 3.1 3.1 99.2
no funding 6 .8 .8 100.0
Total 712 99.7 100.0  
Did not Answer 2 .3    
Total 714 100.0    
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Table 14d     drinking water2 (protection) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 337 47.2 47.4 47.4
provincial funding only 358 50.1 50.4 97.7
unsure 11 1.5 1.5 99.3
no funding 5 .7 .7 100.0
Total 711 99.6 100.0  
Did not Answer 3 .4    
Total 714 100.0    
 
 
 
Table 14e     community infection control (protection) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 164 23.0 23.0 23.0
provincial funding only 445 62.3 62.5 85.5
unsure 48 6.7 6.7 92.3
no funding 55 7.7 7.7 100.0
Total 712 99.7 100.0  
Did not Answer  2 .3    
Total 714 100.0    
 
 
 
Table 14f     outbreak management (protection) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid municipal funding 222 31.1 31.3 31.3
provincial funding only 450 63.0 63.4 94.6
unsure 30 4.2 4.2 98.9
no funding 8 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 710 99.4 100.0  
Did not Answer  4 .6    
Total 714 100.0    
 
 
 
 
 A majority of respondents show stronger support for municipal funding of protection 
programs vs. promotion programs.  However, there is variation in the extent to which promotion 
is always lower than protection.  
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ii. Significant Difference in Support for Health Protection vs. Health Promotion Programs 
 
 714 responses were used for this analysis (N=714).  This analysis, which specifically 
examined the difference in municipal support for programs designated as promotion-type or 
protection-type, showed that municipal councillors much more strongly support municipal 
funding for protection-type programs.  
 Response choices to the last 12 questions, which asked participants to select which choice 
best matched, in their opinion, a particular public health program, were assigned values as 
follows: 
  
Question Response Choices, 12 Programs                                                              Value Assigned 
1.  Municipalities should contribute some or all of the funding for this 
      program/service   1 
2.  100% provincial funding is appropriate for this program/service   0 
3.  I am unsure which level of government should pay for this program/service   0 
4.  There should be no funding for this program/service from either level of government    0 
 
The rationale is that choosing the first selection indicated a willingness to commit 
municipal funds to the particular program.  There was no attempt to ask what percentage of total 
funding should be from municipalities—only a willingness to commit any proportion of the 
funding was measured.  
The responses to the six programs coded ‘protection’ were added together, creating an 
index with values from 0 to 6.  The same was done for the six programs coded ‘promotion’.   The 
means of the two indexes were then compared.  See Tables 15a and 15b.  A significant difference 
in municipal support for protection programs vs. promotion programs was found.   Out of a 
possible score of 6, the mean response for municipal support for ‘promotion’ type programs was 
.77 (>.67 to <.88, 95% confidence interval) and the mean response for ‘protection’ type programs 
was 2.11 (>1.97 to <2.25, 95% confidence interval).  There is less than one chance in 1000 that 
there is no difference in reality between municipal funding support for protection vs. promotion 
programs.  
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Table 15a   Comparing the Means Municipal Support for Protection vs. Promotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Type N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
Promotion 714 .77 1.394 .052 
Protection 714 2.11 1.853 .069 
 
 
Table 15b   t-distribution    
 
Test Value=0 
     95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference   
Promotion 14.851 713 .000 .775 .67 .88 
Protection 30.435 713 .000 2.111 1.97 2.25 
 
  
 
 
 The difference in support for protection vs. promotion programs was also found when the 
variable size of municipality was controlled for.  For protection programs, support for municipal 
funding increased as the size of the municipality increased.  Support for promotion programs also 
increased as population increased but dropped slightly at the greater than 100,000 population 
level.   
  
Table 16   Compare Municipal Support for Promotion and Protection by Population Size of   
Municipality  
 Program  Size of 
Municipality 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Promotion less than 
5,000 
158 .37 .870 .069 .24 .51 0 5 
  between 
5,000 and 
35,000 
366 .76 1.327 .069 .62 .90 0 6 
  between 
35,000 and 
100,000 
84 1.18 1.764 .192 .80 1.56 0 6 
  greater than 
100,000 
105 1.11 1.734 .169 .78 1.45 0 6 
  Total 713 .78 1.394 .052 .67 .88 0 6 
Protection less than 
5,000 
158 1.53 1.587 .126 1.28 1.77 0 6 
  between 
5,000 and 
35,000 
366 2.11 1.811 .095 1.93 2.30 0 6 
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 Program  Size of 
Municipality 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  between 
35,000 and 
100,000 
84 2.30 1.881 .205 1.89 2.71 0 6 
  greater than 
100,000 
105 2.82 2.084 .203 2.42 3.22 0 6 
  Total 713 2.11 1.854 .069 1.97 2.25 0 6 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.  Municipal Funding Support for Protection-type Programs by Population Size of 
Respondent’s Municipality 
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Figure 2.  Municipal Funding Support for Promotion-type Programs by Population Size of 
Respondent’s Municipality 
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Structure of the health unit, specifically whether or not the health unit is integrated 
directly into a municipality or exists as an autonomous board structure was also examined.  
Councillors from both municipally-integrated and autonomous boards were more supportive of 
municipal funding for protection (mean 2.69 and 1.90, respectively) than promotion programs 
(mean 1.20 and .62, respectively).  However, councillors from integrated boards are much more 
supportive of municipal funding for either type of program than are councillors from autonomous 
boards.    
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Table 17 Compare Municipal Support for Promotion and Protection Programs by Health Unit 
Structure  
 Program  Structure N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
promotion 
programs 
Autonomous 
Board 
508 .62 1.226 .054 .51 .73 0 6 
Municipally 
Integrated 
Board 
197 1.20 1.705 .121 .96 1.44 0 6 
Total 705 .78 1.400 .053 .68 .89 0 6 
protection 
programs 
Autonomous 
Board 
508 1.90 1.724 .076 1.75 2.05 0 6 
Municipally 
Integrated 
Board 
197 2.69 2.066 .147 2.40 2.98 0 6 
Total 705 2.12 1.858 .070 1.98 2.26 0 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Municipal Funding Support for Protection-type Programs by Structure of Respondent’s 
Public Health Unit 
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Figure 4.  Municipal Funding Support for Promotion-type Programs by Structure of Respondent’s 
Public Health Unit 
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Urban and rural municipalities can have very different public health issues. For 
promotion programs, willingness to commit municipal funds increased as urban characteristic 
increased.  For protection programs, a similar relationship was noted.  For all urban and rural 
types, municipal funding support was higher for protection programs. 
 
Table 18   Compare Municipal Support for Promotion and Protection Programs by Urban/Rural 
Characteristic  
 Program Urban or 
Rural  
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
promotion 
programs 
urban 
(including 
suburban) 
144 1.11 1.648 .137 .84 1.38 0 6 
mostly urban 
or suburban 
79 1.03 1.544 .174 .68 1.37 0 6 
equally 
urban (or 
suburban) 
and rural 
161 .79 1.438 .113 .57 1.01 0 6 
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 Program Urban or 
Rural  
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
mostly rural 158 .68 1.207 .096 .49 .87 0 6 
rural 171 .46 1.113 .085 .29 .62 0 6 
Total 713 .78 1.394 .052 .67 .88 0 6 
protection 
programs 
urban 
(including 
suburban) 
144 2.22 1.901 .158 1.91 2.54 0 6 
mostly urban 
or suburban 
79 2.24 2.008 .226 1.79 2.69 0 6 
equally 
urban (or 
suburban) 
and rural 
161 2.09 1.870 .147 1.80 2.38 0 6 
mostly rural 158 2.14 1.870 .149 1.85 2.43 0 6 
rural 171 1.94 1.714 .131 1.68 2.20 0 6 
Total 713 2.11 1.854 .069 1.97 2.25 0 6 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.  Municipal Funding Support for Protection-type Programs by Urban or Rural 
Characteristic of Respondent’s Municipality 
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Figure 6.  Municipal Funding Support for Promotion-type Programs by Urban or Rural 
Characteristic of Respondent’s Municipality 
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 Direct Board of Health involvement by a municipal councilor may influence their support for 
protection vs. promotion programs.  Municipal councillors who have had experience as Board 
members (defined as a current board member, a past board member or a member of Council or 
committee of council that acts as a Board) are more likely to be willing to commit municipal 
funds to both promotion and protection programs.  Table 19 shows that this is true in this analysis.  
Overall, this willingness is stronger for protection programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44
Table 19   Compare Municipal Support for Promotion and Protection Programs by Respondent’s 
Involvement as a Board of Committee Member  
Program 
Type 
 Board of 
Health 
Experience 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
promotion 
programs 
no 
experience 
486 .66 1.245 .056 .55 .78 0 6 
experience 228 1.01 1.645 .109 .79 1.22 0 6 
Total 714 .77 1.394 .052 .67 .88 0 6 
protection 
programs 
no 
experience 
486 1.94 1.757 .080 1.78 2.09 0 6 
experience 228 2.48 1.997 .132 2.22 2.74 0 6 
Total 714 2.11 1.853 .069 1.97 2.25 0 6 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.  Municipal Funding Support for Protection-type Programs by Respondent’s Experience as a 
Board of Health Member 
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Figure 8.  Municipal Funding Support for Promotion-type Programs by Respondent’s Experience as a 
Board of Health Member 
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7.  SUMMARY 
 Research was done to examine municipal politicians’ attitudes towards funding local 
public health when programs were divided into promotion-type and protection-type programs to 
ascertain whether this division has any effect on their willingness to write the cheque.  
 When surveyed, Ontario municipal politicians displayed an attitude of strong support for 
government funding of all public health programs they were asked about.  However, there was a 
significant difference in support for committing municipal funds to health protection-type 
programs versus health promotion-type programs.  This support was considerably stronger for 
protection-type programs.  
 There are reasons why local governments have a stake in preserving public health 
protection-type programs.  These include a close relationship between municipal services and 
public health protection.  However, the requirements of an effective public health protection 
system preclude any municipality from fully funding health protection.  A split funding and 
governance model between municipalities and the provincial government meets both the 
considerations of economies-of-scale and municipal involvement in health protection.   
 Future policy changes regarding local public health in Ontario and other jurisdictions 
containing local governments may want to consider the important relationship of protection-type 
programs to municipal services when trying to locate the appropriate level of government for 
funding and control of these programs.   
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